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Now is a very good time to be a historian. Not so long ago the profession was in
a fairly fractious state of collective being. Social historians and cultural historians
were frequently at each other’s throats; mention of Michel Foucault sent ripples of
scorn around the seminar room; powerful voices rallied historians to the ramparts
against postmodernists and other intruders. Much intolerance stalked the halls.
Civility became frayed and occasionally collapsed. Yet these days the professional
gatherings show a refreshing coexistence of outlooks and approaches. If differ-
ences persist, conversation has at least been resumed. Partly the advocates of con-
trary approaches have settled into their own spaces, for under the sign of an open-
ended pluralism everyone claims a niche. But more fundamentally, an interest in
taking the cultural turn is no longer thought to imply leaving social history behind.
Above all, younger generations have been arriving unmarked and unfazed by the
divisiveness of those earlier times. While their legacies sometimes linger, the cul-
ture wars in the discipline seem a thing of the past.
If we can learn anything from that history of contention it must surely
be the importance of talking together. Conversing across differences need not
imply the chimera of a safe but anodyne consensus, whose unity and breadth pre-
sume the suppression of necessary disagreements. Nor would it require avoidance
of complex or troubling questions. Gains in the discipline are rarely recorded
without severe methodological and theoretical conflicts, after all. Because vested
interests, distributions of power, and disparities of standing are all involved, the
advocacy of change entails forms of collective organization, adversarial pleading,
and forcefulness of purpose which are ever likely to excite the passions and divide
opinion. From time to time, a degree of contentiousness can hardly be avoided.
But when that happens, unless generosity and forebearance can be exercised, col-
legiality easily suffers and common goals become obscured.
The two books under review offer a chance to reflect on this practical
eclecticism of the present moment. Each is a document of the contemporary
intellectual history mentioned above. Elizabeth Clark explicitly reflects on the con-
sequences of the linguistic turn, mapping out the key departures while arguing
through to her own preferred standpoint. Martin Jay’s latest book offers less an
explicit commentary on the debates of the present than a window onto the think-
ing of one of intellectual history’s most respected practitioners, who has rarely
intervened directly in the polemics surrounding the linguistic turn, but has always
been alive to their importance.
Over the fullness of his career Martin Jay has provided an imposing
series of thoughtful, penetrating, and exhaustive explications of big conceptual
themes of European thought, adding a major new work roughly every ten years.
The grand ambition of these books has become ever grander. The more bound-
ed focus of his foundational first book, The Dialectical Imagination:  A History of the
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (1973), was succeeded
first by a comprehensive survey of the Western Marxist tradition in Marxism and
Totality:  The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (1984), and then by
Downcast Eyes:  The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (1993),
bringing us thence to Songs of Experience, which displays the grandest sweep of
them all, reaching back from the twentieth century to the sixteenth.1 After The
Dialectical Imagination these studies have shared a common approach, allowing Jay
first to locate a key problematic and then trace how it unfolded through the ideas
of his chosen thinkers. His books consistently map out the topography of a com-
plicated transatlantic exchange, through which European influences migrated
westwards, sometimes via exile and emigration (the Frankfurt School), sometimes
by circulation of ideas (French poststructuralism since the 1970s). Both Marxism
and Totality and Downcast Eyes subtly and patiently rendered these bodies of thought
for a North American readership, in each case tendering critical summations just
as the influence was passing its peak.2
In these terms Songs of Experience seems a more personal and even idio-
syncratic work. In a time of skepticism about the grand scale history of ideas,
when intellectual historians prefer either the more focused monograph or the
essay form, the book’s immense scope is already a distinguishing feature. That
makes Jay’s choice of particular thinkers, chapter by chapter, arranged in accor-
dance with the primary theme to foreground those aspects of their thought as
opposed to others, necessarily a bit arbitrary. His aim is to explore the full reper-
toire of meanings given to the concept of experience between the sixteenth cen-
tury and the present, ranging across different periods and traditions of thought in
order to explore the grounds for the abiding urgency which the concept always
seems to pose. By this means he seeks to illuminate both the sources of contro-
versy among the main traditions of Western thought and their recurrence to cer-
tain commonalties of purpose.
After a brief allusion to classical and medieval uses of the concept of
experience, the book properly begins with a reading of Michel de Montaigne’s
Essays of 1587-88. For Jay, Montaigne’s thinking belonged to the effort after the
Renaissance and Reformation to reconcile meaning and value on the ground of a
holistic humanism fashioned from the contingency and material immediacy of a
lived present, in a way that embraced the messiness, ambiguities, and contradic-
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tions of the experienced world. As Jay puts it: “Reversing the traditional hierar-
chical privileging of timeless verities over transient appearances and tacitly reject-
ing the mystical quest for unity with the divine, Montaigne boldly asserted, ‘I do
not portray being; I portray passing.’ Time, he understood, should not be meas-
ured against a putative eternal plenitude and found wanting; living in the moment
was not inferior to living for eternity.”3 This integrative but sceptical holistic aspi-
ration then gives the rest of the book its baseline, immediately counterposed to the
pull toward science represented by Francis Bacon: “The scientific version [of a
concept of experience], based on a transcendental, disembodied, immortal species
subject located more in partial instruments than fallible bodies, activated the ety-
mological link . . . between experience and experiment, while suppressing the value
of accumulated wisdom from the past.”4 In Jay’s words: “ . . . modern thinkers
who were keen in ‘progressing’ beyond a state of relativistic tolerance for ambigu-
ity and the endurance of life’s misfortunes could not rest content with Montaigne’s
credo.”5
Rather briefly invoking Max Weber, Jay uses the notation of modernity
as “a differentiation of increasingly specialized value spheres” to establish the
overall framing for his book. His explication is worth quoting in full:
Cognitive, aesthetic, and moral institutions and discourses have gained rela-
tive autonomy and generated their own immanent logic of development.
Indeed, within them, specialization produced a welter of distinct sub-
spheres and isolated disciplines without easy commensurability. The whole,
however it may be defined, ceased to hang together in a coherent way. No
longer understood in terms of a great chain of being, a multiplicity of res-
onating similitudes, or a cosmopolis in which the cosmos and the polis are
in tune with each other, the modern world struggled to come to terms with
what Friedrich von Schiller, in the phrase made famous by Weber, called its
‘disenchantment.’ What Bruno Latour has identified as the modern disag-
gregation of hybrids into their component parts—subject and object, cul-
ture (or society) and nature, mind and matter—has meant a penchant for
purification and boundary creation. Even if one avoids nostalgia for a sup-
posed era before the fall into ‘diremption,’ ‘alienation,’ or ‘fragmentation,’ it
does seem clear that modernity was accompanied by an increasing special-
ization of function and the loss of a more integrated sense of life.6
With Montaigne’s unified conception of holistic experience always in the back-
ground, this allows Jay to explore successively the resulting “discrete subvariants,”
of which he distinguishes five. Each receives a substantive chapter, which in the
conceit of the book’s title are presented as a series of “song cycles”: epistemolo-
gy (René Descartes, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant);
religion (Friedrich Schleiermacher, William James, Rudolf Otto, Martin Buber);
aesthetics (Kant again, John Dewey); politics (Edmund Burke, Michael Oakeshott,
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Edward Thompson); and history (Wilhelm Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood, Joan Scott,
Frank Ankersmit). The book then concludes with three chapters on what Jay sees
as the major twentieth-century efforts at recuperating the possibility of a unified
understanding of experience portable across these domains, treating successively
US pragmatism (James, Dewey, Richard Rorty), the critical theory of the Frankfurt
S chool (Walter Benjamin, Theodor A d o rn o ) , and Fre n ch poststru c t u ra l i s m
(Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault).
The result is a tour de force of wide-ranging erudition, which endows each
particularity with both contextual precision and historical depth. It is a rare pleas-
ure, intellectually and pedagogically, to experience Jay’s judicious attentiveness to
the difficulties and contradictions that will always exceed the formal coherence
required by his overarching purpose. The metaphor of journeying to an uncertain
and undisclosed destination both opens and closes the book, and this quality of
“openness to the world” or “interminability” structures its sensibility as well as its
argumentation. For Jay, ultimately, this is the main lesson and injunction of “expe-
rience”: namely, “a willingness to open the seemingly most integrated and self-
contained subject to the outside, thus allowing the perilous, but rewarding journey
to begin.” If William Blake’s ideas had rather oddly receded from the body of the
book after conferring its title (and jacket illustration), in these closing paragraphs
Jay also relinquishes the defining rationalism that guides the exposition in order to
reinvoke those utopian poetics, suggesting that “the struggle itself is the reward,
allowing those brave experimentations in living that tie experience to the future as
much as the past.”7
The richness, balance, and care of Jay’s accounts cannot be gainsaid. For
our purposes there are perhaps four main points to make. Three of these concern
areas of potential critique, each of which also effectively locates Jay’s perduring
intellectual commitments in a formative moment that precedes the long advent of
the so-called linguistic turn. In an extraordinarily impressive way Jay has contin-
ued doing what he has always done, namely to provide searchingly critical treat-
ments of the central dilemmas of social, cultural, and political thought of the
twentieth century that cross the boundaries between rivalrous intellectual tradi-
tions. As Francophone theory began challenging the hold over the US intellectu-
al Left established by the Frankfurt School in the 1960s, Jay has always responded
with generous-minded acuity (in Downcast Eyes to the tune of 600 carefully argued
pages). But in the end he recurs to the ground he originally marked out in the
Dialectical Imagination. What might we say about this career-long continuity?
First, Jay’s writing continues to be moved by a humanist desire for a
workable concept of totality. The plea at the end of Songs of Experience for an
open-ended understanding of experience that can allow for both centeredness and
fragmentation echoes the conclusion to Marxism and Totality twenty years before.
There, ruminating on “The Challenge of Post-Structuralism,” while reaffirming
“the legacy left by the agonizingly flawed, yet admirably heroic, efforts made by
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the Western Marxists to see things whole,” he wished for a “liberating totalization
that will not turn into its opposite.” Once we abandon that commitment and
retreat into “anti-holistic particularism,” he argued, “we are likely to suffer that ter-
minal closure which will demonstrate what a serious rather than merely playful
deconstruction of human culture really can mean.” To give up on the questions
asked by the Western Marxists would be “to resign ourselves to a destiny against
which everything that makes us human should compel us to resist.”8
Second, in this new book Jay’s method leads to a severely under-contex-
tualized form of intellectual history. He apologizes for this relative thinness at the
outset, explaining that “Our main cast of characters will be large and diverse
enough to make any sustained attempt to contextualize the origin and develop-
ment of their individual ideas practically impossible.”9 But the costs are high. Of
course, contextualizing can mean various things. Thickness may consist in a
greater density of textual readings, developed from both the immediate subjects
themselves and the pertinent additional thinkers; in the richness of the biograph-
ical research, including use of the non-published archive; in the relating of thought
to other kinds of social, cultural, and political history; in the deployment of rele-
vant historiography; or in the drawing on other disciplines. Some of the best
recent intellectual histories, Scott Specter’s Prague Territories, for example, or John
Toews’ Becoming Historical, invariably exhibit all or several of these.10 This contex-
tual thinness in Jay’s exposition also has bearing on his choice of particular
thinkers, or rather on the unclear basis of their selection, because some notable
absences emerge. Neither phenomenology nor Nietzsch e a n i s m , n e i t h e r
Lebensphilosophie nor the entire opening towards non-Western (that is, ‘Eastern’)
philosophical traditions in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, nei-
ther Wittgenstein nor Husserl, receive much effective acknowledgment. Nor, glar-
ingly, does Freud. The virtual absence of feminism is likewise surprising. Given a
different strategy of contextualizing, none of these neglects would have been fea-
sible. Necessarily, the chapters closest to one’s own expertise prove the least sat-
isfying in this regard. The benefits of Jay’s grand sweep—the gathering of so
many diverse commentaries to the overarching theme of experience—are patent.
The interesting question is whether, and in what form, some stronger elements of
contextualizing might have been added.
Third, this book confirms Jay’s affiliations as a modernist of a rather clas-
sical kind. More clearly than his previous works, because it reaches much further
back in time to the Enlightenment and far beyond, it reveals his critical identifica-
tion with certain deep-historical genealogies of rationalist and humanist thought.
Proceeding from a ground of Enlightenment philosophy (Modernism I, so to
speak), though, he lingers most persistently in the territories of the later modernist
interrogations of those traditions (Modernism II) between the fin de siècle and the
rise of fascism. This was the terrain of his first two major books (three if we
count Adorno), the second of which closed with a sustained reflection on the new
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challenge of poststructuralism.11 While extraordinarily impressive on its own
terms, moreover, his principal substantive engagement with the latter is thematized
and historicized around the particular question of the “denigration of vision” or
“anti-ocularcentrism,” rather than being addressed to the fullness of its contem-
porary contexts.12 His main commentaries on the politics of knowledge implicat-
ed in the poststructuralist challenge, still more in the discourse of postmodernism,
have been reserved for his essays.13 In these terms, Jay’s career has evolved in par-
allel with the developments registered by the other two books under review, always
cognisant, often directly in dialogue, but definitely not on board.
For our purposes perhaps the most interesting aspect of Jay’s book, final-
ly, is that it concentrates on ‘experience’ in the first place. As he observes, a major
effort was expended by Joan Scott and other advocates of the linguistic turn dur-
ing the early 1990s in displacing the concept from serious analytical use.14 Scott
had developed a decisive critique of the projects of retrieval and trans-temporal
identification motivating many of the proliferating social histories of the 1960s
and 1970s conceived as “history from below,” including feminist histories, insist-
ing instead on the complex discursive disjunctions and mediations that rendered
past experiences epistemologically unavailable in such foundational terms. The
“evidence of experience” could never be the secure ground of analysis because
experience was always already a discursively constructed category. Accordingly,
“we need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position
subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have experiences,
but subjects who are constituted through experience.”15 Because experience was
always linguistically informed and inflected, Scott argued, the agency and subjec-
tivity of past actors could only ever be accessed by means of the traces they left
in haphazardly surviving documents that were never purely or straightforwardly
their own.
While placing the concept of experience seriously into question for any-
one seeking to understand the consequences of the linguistic turn, this powerful
intervention was aimed politically against those who claimed experience as a
source of historical authority in essentializing ways. For those voices, Scott
argued, history was invoked “to essentialize identity and reify the subject,”
enabling certain kinds of priorities politically while disallowing and delegitimizing
others:
In some circles experience is the ground for an identity politics that under-
stands differences among its constituents to be matters of false conscious-
ness or opportunism. Experience is taken as an accurate description of
closed systems of domination and oppression; knowledge is taken to be the
simple reflection of objective experience. That’s the version of experience
I want to call into question, substituting for it a notion of experience as a
theorized reading that is made possible, but not inevitably or singularly, by
one’s relationship to dominant institutions and discourses.16
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If Scott had also granted that realistically “experience is not a word we can do with-
out,” so that it could scarcely be abandoned altogether, then in practice it migrat-
ed to the margins and interstices of most theoretically informed historiography
during the ensuing years.17 From having “represented the promise of social histo-
ry to render audible the voices of previously silenced historical actors, to explicate
the layers of meaning in their actions and interventions in history,” Kathleen
Canning observes, it now “faded from the center stage of historical productions,
rarely featured in book titles, and no longer constituted either an object of inves-
tigation or a methodological approach.” From once having “marked the cross-
roads where ‘social being’ and ‘social thought’ coalesced and converged . . . the cat-
egory of experience was dislodged from its location at these epistemological cross-
roads and relegated to the sidelines, where it remained an empty shell stripped of
the traces of its past significance.”18 But if rarely explicitly acknowledged, experi-
ence continued to speak through the works of social and cultural historians, espe-
cially those of the practitioners of Alltagsgeschichte (history of everyday life) and
others of an anthropological disposition, where it figured as “the unspoken, the
implicitly materialized and oppositional counterpart of the discursive and/or the
narrative.”19 “[D]ivested of its complexity, of the layers of memory and emotion,
of the passions and positionings that propelled historical change at crucial turning
points, such as desire, rage, despair, resistance,” experience became re-positioned
as the binary other to discourse. Yet in exactly this same period, the remarkable
burgeoning of new historical work in areas like “memory, body, and subjectivity”
has patently instated precisely the experiential, however carefully redescribed, as an
inescapable ground of study.20 Given this continuing concern with experience—
the prevalence of the concept “in a practical state,” so to speak —it becomes a
matter of some urgency to re-elaborate a workable concept of experience some-
where beyond the dichotomous framework (experience versus discourse) left
behind by Scott’s necessary critique. Not the least of the salutary contributions of
Martin Jay’s new book is to have helped recover the complex conceptual terrain
upon which this might fruitfully occur.
Turning now to Elizabeth Clark’s History, Theory, Text, we find a fine and
scrupulous account of the wider and deeper intellectual histories of historiogra-
phy that brought avowed poststructuralists like Scott to the standpoints they were
adopting by the early 1990s. A distinguished historian of early Christianity, Clark’s
purpose is to bring the gains of ‘critical’ or ‘postmodern’ theory into a region of
the discipline where so far their impact has been small, namely late antiquity and
the early medieval eras. As it happens, only one of Clark’s eight chapters (thirty
pages out of 185) is devoted specifically to that purpose, leaving the lion’s share
for an exhaustive account of theories of history between the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury and the present more generally. The results are hugely valuable for anyone
seeking this kind of guide, irrespective of any interest in early medieval history per
se. Such exegesis is hardly particularly new, but Clark delivers a survey of such
Peace in the Neighbourhood 117
completeness and explanatory care that it deserves a place on any syllabus of crit-
ical introductions to these debates.
The book begins with Rankean historical positivism and its reception in
the United States in the later nineteenth century, when history began to be consti-
tuted as a discipline. As she moves through the twentieth century Clark traverses
the ground of Peter Novick’s now classic anatomy of the American historical pro-
fession, That Noble Dream, moving briskly past the early dissenting critiques of
Charles Beard and Carl Becker, before alighting among the epistemological
debates of our own time.21 If here Clark focuses on mapping the overall terrain,
marshaling a remarkable range of contemporary references (for a twenty-page
chapter these amount to seventeen pages of 177 endnotes), the second chapter
moves into a more particularized discussion of Anglo-American analytical philos-
ophy centering on the logical positivism of Carl Hempel and Karl Popper. This
is perhaps the least interesting piece of the book, mainly because (pace Arthur
Danto) it remains unclear how far such currents acquired either broader intellec-
tual resonance or institutional presence among historians at large. In comparison,
the next chapter on “Language and Structures” provides an admirably taut and
accessible twenty-page guide to the specific importance of structuralism in the
1960s, beginning with Saussurian linguistics and proceeding through the impact of
Claude Lévi-Strauss. The great virtue of this discussion, which properly moves
the book into high gear, is to have recovered the isolable characteristics of the
structuralist moment per se, for by the time of Joan Scott’s interventions in the
mid 1980s that had become largely subsumed into the generalized appropriation
of ‘French theory’ without any longer being distinguished from the intervening
poststructuralist departures.22 Once French theoretical influences began sweeping
parts of the American academy by the turn of the 1980s, the boundaries between
‘structuralist’ and ‘poststructuralist’ orientations had become confusingly scram-
bled. The pervasiveness of the influence of Foucault and rapid lionizing of
Jacques Derrida by literary scholars then made it much harder to see the complex
passages actually negotiated out of structuralism inside France itself.23 Clark now
successfully retrieves that sequence. As she says, “several features of the struc-
turalist program” lasted into the succeeding period, “including its denaturalization
of culture, its privileging of discontinuity over continuity, its semiotic interpreta-
tion of culture, its injunction to break down and rebuild the object of study, and
its attention to the self-referring quality of language.”24
On that basis Clark reviews the genealogies of the historiographical pres-
ent. She distinguishes three main strands, devoting a chapter successively to each.
She begins with the most innovative and theoretically self-conscious influences
coming in the 1960s and 1970s from inside the discipline itself, including Annales
in France, microhistory in Italy, and Marxist historiography in Britain. She then
continues via the various narratological critiques of Paul Ricoeur, Paul Veyne, and
Roland Barthes to explicate the new narrativism of Hayden White, Hans Kellner,
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and Frank Ankersmit. She concludes with the new intellectual history exemplified
in the U S by Dominic LaCapra, in France by Michel de Certeau, Roger Chartier,
and of course Foucault. Here the highly compressed quality of the accounts is
only partially compensated by the accompanying density of the endnotes. While
legitimately selective, sometimes the coverage inevitably frustrates. For example,
two paragraphs on Begriffsgeschichte (the history of concepts associated with
Reinhart Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner Conze), and two on Alltagsgeschichte
(history of everyday life) can make little sense for anyone who does not already
have some familiarity with the West German historical scene.25 Nonetheless, over-
all these are exceptionally well handled critical surveys of the relevant bodies of
writing.
The red thread of metacritique running through these chapters concerns
what Clark sees as a shying away from overtly self-conscious theorizing or an aver-
sion against epistemology, a pattern recurring often enough, she argues, to warrant
description as a generalized syndrome. Either the historians under discussion
show a tendency to back away from theory in the name of an appeal to the ‘real’
of the evidence in the archive; or by the very virtue of taking an overtly theoreti-
cal stance they effectively marginalize themselves. If Eric Hobsbawm becomes an
example of the former, then for Clark both Hayden White and Foucault figure as
the latter.26 At one rather limited level that might be true of Hobsbawm and the
other British Marxist historians, although an absence in their writings of formal
abstraction should not be taken to mean that no theory is inscribed or embedded
there. But the claim vis à vis White and Foucault seems merely perverse: the influ-
ence of Metahistory (published in 1973) certainly took time to percolate, but via the
larger impact of the linguistic turn it rapidly came into its own; likewise, Foucault
may not have been taken up by historians during the 1970s, but by the end of the
following decade he was everywhere.
Still more to the point, advocacy of the linguistic turn during the later
1980s and 1990s proceeded more generally by means of explicit and sustained
attentiveness to epistemology, sometimes obsessively so. It was certainly the case
that the partisans of poststructuralism and postmodernism during those debates
routinely denied to their opponents any comparable sophistication with theory,
and Clark is by no means the first commentator to imply that a proper degree of
theoretical self-consciousness announced itself only with Joan Scott’s self re-
invention and the arrival of Dominick LaCapra. Yet as ought to be clear, theoret-
ically informed history was being produced in parts of the discipline well before
the 1980s, if with considerably less fanfare. Indeed, the practical eclecticism
essayed by many historians as they tried out the new ideas from France was a far
more sophisticated, productive, and honourable form of intellectual engagement
than the emergent epistemological avant-garde of the time were ever willing to
acknowledge. At the end of her own treatment of the new intellectual history,
Clark herself cautions against an over-radicalized conception of textuality, because
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seeking to ‘textualize’ the social or ‘nontextual world’ can be no less misguided
than continuing to treat texts transparently as the repository of practices and
events ‘as they really were.’ Yet the import of that caution seems not so far
removed from the kind of epistemological eclecticism that tends to appear rather
as a weakness when Clark is expounding the discussions of the 1970s and 1980s.27
The final pay-off for Clark comes in her final chapter, which employs
“LaCapra’s conception of the intellectual historian’s task . . . [as] a helpful charter
for the reconsideration of early Christian history.”28 For our purposes the penul-
timate chapter on “Texts and Contexts” is the more relevant, as it provides a beau-
tifully distilled account of the kinds of analysis the linguistic turn has enabled.
There Clark guides us through some of the major interchanges among intellectu-
al historians, while considering the broader cross-disciplinary interest, notably
among cultural anthropologists and new cultural historians, in expanding the
notion of textuality for the purpose of rendering social and cultural practices, as
well as literary texts, susceptible to interpretive readings. After briefly exploring
the rigorous understanding of textuality offered by Derrida, Foucault, and
Ricoeur, she then counterposes Derrida’s and LaCapra’s powerful iterations of the
latter against the contextualist standpoints of Quentin Skinner and J. G. A.
Pocock.29 She closes the chapter with a brilliantly succinct critique of Clifford
Geertz’s project of a textualized interpretive anthropology and its enormous res-
onance among historians since the 1970s, closing with a brief but equally telling
citation of the debate among Robert Darnton, Chartier, and LaCapra in the mid-
1980s about the methods of the emergent new cultural history.30 The big issue
that remains unresolved at the end of these lucid and astute commentaries, how-
ever, is that of social contextualization, or the possible ground from which the
“extra-textual” might then be theorized and approached. If in adjudicating the
various debates presented in this chapter Clark’s sympathies seem consistently
drawn toward the stronger versions of textuality, she still seeks ways back and out
from the text to its contexts of social production. She chooses to explore that
conundrum in the book’s final chapter via Gabrielle Spiegel’s idea of the “social
logic of the text,” but the possibilities are left tantalizingly unresolved.31
This dualism, I would argue, between “the site of the text’s production
and . . . the text’s own productivity,” which becomes further compounded by the
multiplicity both of possible readings and of imaginable readers, describes the
space of difficulty and creativity for historians writing now. Clark has positioned
her book self-consciously inside that continuing moment. As she says, there is now
very widespread scepticism about the large-scale explanatory and developmental
frameworks that until recently formed the default ground from which historians
tended to approach their studies in time and place—those “‘grand narratives’ that
often mask ideological presuppositions, as well as categories such as ‘experience’
if understood as a foundational court of appeal.” Large numbers of historians,
particularly of younger generations and especially those currently in graduate
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school, “implicitly or explicitly acknowledge that a correspondence theory of ver-
ification is untenable, and that their own representations are not to be confused with
reference.” The possibility of the retrieval or reconstruction of an empirically avail-
able past has certainly not ceased to inspire historians’ imaginations or move their
desire. But their understanding of the kind of claims exactly which a process of
historical reconstruction can enable has become far less confident, far more uncer-
tain and mediated than before. As Clark says, these days many “look less to his-
torical continuity . . . than to discontinuity, noting both breaks in the larger histor-
ical order and the gaps, absences, aporias, and contradictions in texts.” They
understand that “as intellectual constructions” their histories cannot be identical
with ‘the past’ but rather remain irresolvably different. In that sense the past has
irretrievably “vanished” and can become “available only through ‘traces.’” Finally,
“no historical construction is ‘politically innocent’ but is driven by the problems
and questions set by the historian in the present.”32
If for some historians these recognitions have been unsettling, provok-
ing many anxieties and a sense of threat, for others they have seemed like an
opportunity, opening the way for a more creative and experimental set of
approaches.33 If ‘history’ can now be regarded as the unattainable or unreachable
‘real’ of past time, which in its completeness or any supposed objective or essen-
tial coherence is neither recoverable nor directly accessible, that does not somehow
render the historian’s labours nugatory. Those labours comprise the craft knowl-
edge, repertoire of methodologies, breadth of theoretical awareness, and organiz-
ing intelligence which the historian brings to the necessarily unfinishable work of
representation. They comprise everything devoted to rendering the past readable.
Here we can distinguish between ‘the past’ as the object of study, which historians
seek to appropriate in the form of knowledge, and ‘history’ as the stories, analy-
ses, and representations produced about the past, which we might rather call ‘his-
toriography.’ Between ‘the past’ and ‘history qua historiography’ are then inter-
posed two necessary and inescapable barriers: on the one hand, the ‘archive,’ or
all the stuff and matter that can be turned into ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’; and on the
other hand, the historian’s interventions, which impart to that stuff and matter
coherent narrative or interpretive form.
That is, the past can be made knowable only by an active process of con-
struction, which shapes not only the ensuing interpretations, but even the docu-
mentation on which these have to be based. This mediating and constructive
agency of the historian is managed through language, through the operative ana-
lytical categories, and through the entire cognitive apparatus historians bring to
their study. Of course, the ‘real past’ is not a figment of our imagination. But that
past is simply not reachable or self-evident as such: if the past has actually exist-
ed, it can never acquire meaning until the historian begins shaping it as history. In
other words, we need to distinguish between the past traces of an earlier time (the
past-as-history) and the labours of reconstruction which inscribe those traces with
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meaning (history-as-knowledge). The one is never attainable except by the media-
tion of the other, and consequently the knowledge historians deliver can only ever
be partial, provisional, and decisively prefigured by the historian’s complex partic-
ularities of outlook. If we put these first two ideas together—the irrecoverable
remoteness of the past (its necessary non-identity with history), and its fashioning
into history by the historian’s manufacture of coherence (the writing of ‘the past’
into ‘history’ by the shaping of narrative)—then we come easily to a third idea,
namely, the growing attention now being paid to the specifically literary qualities
of historical work. The key early influence here, of course, was Hayden White,
whose Metahistory argued that all works of history, even when adhering single-
mindedly to the rules of evidence, standards of objectivity, and a ‘scientific’
method, are constructed nonetheless around predictable narratological forms,
drawing on finite modes of argumentation, types of emplotment, ideological
frames, and rhetorical tropes.
The views I have just expounded would make me a ‘postmodernist’ in
the sense claimed by the avowed ‘postmodernist historians’ of the 1990s. The
three arguments described above probably should count as the enduring legacy of
those interventions, around which it might even be possible these days for a rea-
sonably broad if tentative consensus to coalesce: first, regarding the irrecoverable
remoteness of the past; second, regarding the necessary constructedness of histo-
riography; and third, regarding the necessity of a formalist narratology for any full
understanding of the complex mediations between ‘the past-as-history’ and ‘his-
tory-as-knowledge’ that will always already be present in the writings and labours
of historians. But beyond this ground lies a more difficult terrain, where the his-
torian’s distinctive knowledge and practices (history’s epistemologies?) start to
become far less distinct, and instead begin blurring into those of other disciplines,
such as those of literary studies. It is here, I think, that we find ourselves recur-
ring to that ground of contextualization which surfaced at several points during
my discussion of the books by Martin Jay and Elizabeth Clark above—namely,
that desirable density of all the elaborate, careful, and creative contextualizing and
readings that we do in order to assemble the kind of archive our historiography
has to presuppose.
In other words, as historians we can accept all the arguments that literary
theorists would make about history’s textuality—about aporia and incommensura-
bility, about the necessary heterogeneity and unfinishedness that has to be worked
upon before history can appear as a unity, about the forms of narratological equiv-
alence associating history with fiction, about the necessary presentation of contra-
dictions over the chimera of wanting to resolve them, about the distinctions
between narrative and history, representation and the real. We can acknowledge
the productivity of the tension between the necessarily incomplete attempts in his-
toriography to capture complexity in coherent and unified narratives on the one
hand, and on the other hand the persisting multiplicity of temporalities intersect-
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ing inside particular moments and events of the past, which will always have to
remain unrepresentable in some final sense. We can accept all of that. But per-
haps that is the point at which the historian’s distinctive labours really begin.
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